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“THE NUREMBERG CODE”  
 
When does clinical research designed to save lives and advance medicine 
become assault and murder? In the twentieth century the line between 
legitimate research on human subjects and criminal assault has been 
variously drawn. The demands of the researcher and the voice of the 
research subject and patient have received varying recognition. With the 
upswing of clinical research in the early twentieth century and some 
dramatic breakthroughs in medicine there was a tendency to heroise the 
researcher in the “fight” against disease. In Nazi Germany, there were 
strong pressures to conduct research on lives deemed worthless in the 
hope of producing valuable breakthroughs in medical research to benefit 
the nation and race. After all, if the mentally ill and racially inferior Jews 
and Gypsies were going to be killed, their bodies might still serve a useful 
purpose. After WW2 the Nuremberg Trials were conducted on the basis of 
“crimes against humanity”, and by documenting wartime atrocities did 
much to safeguard human rights and dignity. After the four-power 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg came the trial against 20 
Nazi doctors and three SS administrators: this concluded with a 
declaration on the conduct of research based on the autonomy and consent 
of the research subject. 
On 18 August 1947 a tribunal of three judges at Nuremberg 
promulgated these guidelines on the conduct of human experiments, and 
how research subjects could be protected. The judges spoke of the 
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requirement for a “Voluntary Consent” on the part of the research subject. 
This declaration was unique among all the Nuremberg Trials, both the 
International Military Tribunal of 1945-46 and the subsequent series of 
United States-conducted “successor trials” at Nuremberg from 1946 to 
1951. The Doctors‟ Trial was the only occasion that a set of principles 
arising from the judicial proceedings was promulgated. The judges stated 
that while the principles provided rationales for their verdicts, they also 
hoped that these principles would establish guidelines for best practice in 
research.  
These principles have subsequently been called the “Nuremberg 
Code” and have been linked with the emergence of the principle of 
“Informed Consent”. These principles represent a significant extension of 
liberties in that they protect an individual‟s body and personal autonomy. 
Contrary to what is often assumed, the term “Informed Consent” does not 
appear in the original statement of principles. The term “Nuremberg 
Code” is also retrospective, and applied only in the mid-1960s.1 Certainly 
ideas of consent have become fundamental for clinical research. Indeed, 
they have been extended to all clinical practice. A further step during the 
1990s is to see consent as governing all aspects of human relations. 
Important issues arise: first, how well the Medical or Doctors‟ Trial took 
on aboard Nazi medical abuses, which were ultimately genocidal? What 
distinction there might be between “voluntary consent” and “informed 
consent”? Here issues arise concerning disclosure of medical information 
concerning the rationales of the experiment on the one side, and the 
autonomy of the research subject on the other. 
The historiography divides into two camps. One sees the Nuremberg 
verdict on the Nazi doctors and medical officials as central. The other sees 
a series of case law verdicts as leading to informed consent. 
Coincidentally both strands consider the post-war period with the rise of 
clinical research as crucial.
2
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The Medical Trial happened to be the first of a series of trials dealing 
with different sectors of the Nazi system of power. The Trial was also 
distinctive in that victims gave eloquent testimony about what they had 
endured at the hands of their medical torturers. At times the judges asked 
for opinions from both defendants and prosecutors for their views on the 
conduct of medical research. In this sense the trial was also an ethics 
tribunal. It meant that the trial documentation gained iconic status as an 
overview of human experimentation and atrocities under National 
Socialism. After the Trial, involved lawyers and psychiatrists arranged 
care and supported efforts to secure compensation. The legacy of the 
Nuremberg Medical Trial has substantial importance in medicine of the 
second half of the twentieth century when there was an upswing of 
clinical research, and an evident need for ethical regulation.  
The legacy of the Doctors‟ Trial or more accurately the Medical Trial 
– as three Nazi officials were prosecuted - may be viewed as consisting of 
the ethical requirement of consent, and the lesser known efforts to provide 
care, and to commemorate the victims. The question was raised around 
the time of the Nuremberg trials as to those victims who were killed, and 
how they could be best commemorated? An International Scientific 
Commission on War Crimes worked parallel to the Medical Trial to 
assemble details of all unethical experiments and research by the Nazis.
3
 
The task emerged as too great for the limited resources at the time, and the 
Commission was further marginalised in the post-war medical politics. 
The focus became that of legally based “informed consent”. However, the 
history is wider ranging and more complex. 
It is often overlooked how several of the Nuremberg Trials considered 
evidence for medical atrocities. Human experiments and coerced research 
were already raised at the four-power International Military Tribunal. 
They were given a high profile as part of a general pattern of Nazi 
atrocities. During the following period of United States administration, the 
trials of Air Marshall Milch and the SS economic administrator Oswald 
Pohl also considered the coerced and often fatal experiments. Other trials 
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at Nuremberg dealt with atrocities perpetrated by specific groups (as the 
judiciary, high command and industrialists).
4
  
The fact that victims did not volunteer or consent to the experiments 
was part of the prosecution case in the successor trials. The issue was 
raised in the trial against 23 officials of the IG Farben chemical 
corporation, when the extensive typhus (Fleckfieber) experiments at 
Buchenwald were part of the prosecution case as Count Three concerning 
war crimes. The defence countered that conscientious tests with animals 
were carried out to ensure the safety of the drugs.
5
 Moreover, the defence 
alleged that the criteria for criminality of experiments established at the 
Medical Trial were not met. The defence argued, using evidence from the 
Dachau camp doctor, Helmuth Vetter (a former scientist with IG-Farben 
at Leverkusen and who later oversaw experiments at the concentration 
camps of Auschwitz and Mauthausen-Gusen), that rather than (criminal) 
experiments, there had been allegedly legitimate “clinical tests” or 
“practical tests.”6 “Medical Experiments” figured as part of Count Three 
(slave labour) in the charges against the defendants. Here the charge was 
of: “Experiments on human beings (including concentration camp 
inmates), without their consent, were conducted by Farben to determine 
the effects of deadly gases, vaccines, and related products.”7  
Himmler had ambitions for the SS to become a major producer of 
pharmaceuticals, surpassing IG-Farben. He authorised large-scale 
infectious disease experiments in concentration camps as a way of 
realizing these schemes. Typhus, transmitted by infected lice, was 
denounced as a “Jewish fever” that had to be conquered as it was endemic 
in Eastern Poland and the Soviet Union. The SS medical researchers 
effectively stole an innovative vaccine devised at the Pasteur Institute in 
Paris and produced from typhus rickettsia cultured on rabbit lungs. At the 
concentration camp of Buchenwald SS medical researchers infected 
prisoners, using some prisoners (who mostly died) as “Passage-Persons” 
to maintain cultures of the vaccine, and others as test subjects for the new 
vaccine.
8
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The defence at the IG-Farben Trial took the position of a collective 
denial of responsibility and knowledge of the criminal experiments at 
Auschwitz.
9
 The accused pleaded that they were conscientious 
professionals. The judges accepted the distinction between an experiment 
(Versuch) and a clinical test or trial: 
 
“Without going into detail to justify a negative factual conclusion, 
we may say that the evidence falls short of establishing the guilt of 
said defendants on this issue beyond a reasonable doubt…The 
question as to whether the reports submitted to Farben by its 
testing physicians disclosed that illegal uses were being made of 
such drugs revolves around a controversy as to the proper 
translation of the German word “Versuch” found in such reports 
and in the documents pertaining thereto. The prosecution says that 
“Versuch” means “experiment” and that the use of this word in 
said reports was notice to the defendants that testing physicians 
were indulging in unlawful practices with such drugs. The 
defendants contend, however, that “Versuch”, as used in the 
context, mean “test” and that the testing of new drugs on sick 
persons under the reasonable precautions that Farben exercised 
was not only permissible but proper. Applying the rule that where 
from credible evidence two reasonable inferences may be drawn, 
one of guilt and the other of innocence, the latter must prevail, we 
must conclude that the prosecution has failed to establish that part 
of the charge here under consideration.”10 
 
This verdict of the judges at the IG Farben trial that “tests” were 
permissible effectively reversed the verdict and guidelines pronounced by 
the judges at the close of the Medical Trial. The distinction between a 
therapeutic “test” and an experiment relied on some skilful conjuring with 
terminology by the defendants and defence lawyers. Here, it can be seen 
that the Nuremberg Trials left an ambivalent and contradictory legacy, on 
the one hand with guidelines to protect research subjects, and on the other 
hand permissive allowing constant clinical testing. 
The Nuremberg Medical Trial of 1946–47 was necessarily selective as 
to who was available for prosecution, and since then only clusters of 
victims have been identified. In the early 1980s Günther Schwarberg, a 
journalist for the illustrated magazine Stern, named a set of child victims 
for his reconstruction of the life histories of the “twenty children” killed in 
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Hamburg after transport from Auschwitz for a tuberculosis immunisation 
experiment. The question arises whether what Schwarberg achieved in 
microcosm can be achieved for the totality of victims? Victims of 
experiments have only recently been systematically researched, and the 
evidence is that there were at least 15500 victims of the coerced 
research.
11
 There is a strange irony regarding the ethical and legal 
protection of victims of medical atrocities. This is that the principles of 
informed consent and protection of personal data lead to the withholding 
of victim-related data. A sort of “Catch 22” situation arises: that the 
information about victims cannot be released without their consent, but 
you will never know who the victim may have been unless this is released. 
Such a situation prevents the reconstructing of victims‟ life histories – 
something that provides a long overdue historical basis for compensation 
and recognises victims and survivors. The effect is not to protect the 
victims but to protect the identities of the perpetrators of medical 
atrocities. Moreover, the idea of a “Nuremberg Code” with “informed 
consent” as a key feature can be seen as retrospective constructs dating 
from the 1960s. From about this time, the first efforts to identify victims 
arose, but this was (and remains) a highly marginalised activity, outside 
the historical mainstream. 
The Medical Trial was in Chief Prosecutor Telford Taylor‟s words 
“no mere murder trial”, by which he meant that human experiments were 
more complex in terms of their intention and organisation than 
straightforward acts of violence. In fact, the prosecutors delegated to the 
medical case construed medical atrocities as acts of violence and murder, 
but ethical issues were periodically discussed in court. The resulting 
judicial guidelines on human experiments provided research subjects with 
safeguards, both at an individual and collective level.  
How public was the judicial declaration on human experiments? The 
Nuremberg Trials were conducted under military security. Yet throughout 
journalists, the German delegation of medical observers, other medical 
observers and national delegates were present. In 1949 the neurologist 
Alexander Mitscherlich who led the German Medical Chambers included 
the judicial guidelines as a contribution for a future international 
agreement.
12
 Although 10000 copies of his analysis of the Medical Trial, 
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Wissenschaft ohne Menschlichkeit (Science without Humanity) were 
printed, it is likely that the circulation was in fact limited through the 
antagonism of senior clinicians. The reissued edition in April 1960 did 
include the judicial guidelines, and the book has shaped all subsequent 
analyses of the Medical Trial, at least in Germany.  
The ethical discourse was by no means restricted to the courtroom. 
Victims had established an ethical agenda prior to the Medical Trial. 
There was an explosion of human rights declarations around 1946-48, as 
the UN General Assembly Convention on the Crime and Punishment of 
Genocide of 9 December 1948 and the UN Declaration on Human Rights 
of 10 December 1948. The UN declared Genocide as a crime under 
international law: 
 
“genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent 
to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group, as such: 
 (a) Killing members of the group; 
 (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the 
group; 
 (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life 
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in 
part; 
 (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the 
group; 
 (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”13 
 
 Here, the judicial declaration should be considered in the context of a 
wider human rights discourse. Figures like the campaigner for the 
recognition of genocide as an international crime, Raphael Lemkin saw 
how minorities – whether ethnic, religious or cultural were inherently in 
peril and vulnerable to persecution and wholesale extinction. Lemkin 
escaped the Nazis when Poland was invaded, and invented the term 
“genocide” in 1944. The issue of genocide was significant in shaping 
issues for prosecution at the Nuremberg Medical Trial. The medical 
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intelligence officer, John Thompson, provided a link between the 
Nuremberg Medical Trial and international organisations like Unesco.
14
  
 
TOWARDS A CODE 
 
The term “Nuremberg Code” was not used until the 1960s. The idea 
of consent was qualified in a variety of ways, for example as 
“enlightened” or “voluntary”. Once one scrutinises its origins, status and 
meaning, the Nuremberg Code and the associated idea of “informed 
consent” are retrospective constructs of a more recent bioethical discourse 
– when there was a “codification of the Code” from the 1980s.  
The origins of “informed consent” lie in prisoner protests against 
maltreatment. During the war, victims protested that coerced experiments 
violated their rights as prisoners. On 4 March 1945 liberated Auschwitz 
prisoner doctors made an international declaration on how prisoners had 
been treated as experimental animals; they hoped that the Allies and neutral 
states would bring to trial those responsible. Their intention was that 
bringing the perpetrators to justice would mean that such atrocities should 
not recur in the future. Survivors and witnesses of human experiments called 
for documentation of Nazi medical atrocities, justice and compensation. The 
released prisoners organised committees and issued newsletters about the 
experiments. By asking when the issue of unethical experiments was first 
raised, and by whom and in what circumstances, we find that the research 
subject, and medical understanding of the victim is at the core of the story. 
This contact with victims was lost, when what later became known as the 
Nuremberg Code has achieved recognition. 
The Allied Medical Intelligence Officer, John Thompson, who drove 
forward an ethical agenda to tackle “medical war crimes”, illustrates this 
loss of perspective. Crucial was the encounter with victims, in his case 
survivors at Bergen-Belsen. Thompson‟s position was to combine Martin 
Buber‟s idea of a communing relationship of physician and patient with a 
spiritually based philosophy of the whole person. In late November 1945 
Thompson flagged up the issue of Nazi human experiments by 
introducing the concept of a “medical war crime”. Thompson defined 
what scientific practices were criminal, and began documenting where and 
when the criminality occurred. He alleged that 90% of the work of leading 
German clinicians and researchers was criminal. In November 1945 he 
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was the first to identify the human experiments as “Medical War Crimes” 
– this new term provided a basis for joint medical and legal investigations. 
Thompson alleged that “the sacrifice of humans as experimental subjects” 
was widespread in Germany. He demanded comprehensive documentation 
and ethical analysis. He was convinced that inaction would condone the 
experiments, and that “there is equally a danger that these practices may 
continue in Germany or spread to other countries.”15 Thompson secured an 
inter-Allied meeting of war crimes investigators. He established the 
International Scientific Commission at Nuremberg to document and 
ethically analyse all unethical medical experiments, not just those which 
took place in concentration camps, as it became Allied policy to prosecute 
only the latter.  
Thompson provides a corrective to a standard bioethical approach of 
seeing a progressive development of codes from the generalised Hippocratic 
Oath to the Helsinki Declaration by the World Medical Association of 1964 
when “informed consent” was key: 
 
“9. In any research on human beings, each potential subject must be 
adequately informed of the aims, methods, anticipated benefits and 
potential hazards of the study and the discomfort it may entail. He or 
she should be informed that he or she is at liberty to abstain from 
participation in the study and that he or she is free to withdraw visor 
her consent to participation at any time.” 
 
This approach moves from the Hippocratic Oath, to the Reich 
regulations on the conduct of research with humans of 1931, to the 
Nuremberg Code, and then on to Helsinki Declaration. Thompson‟s 
response to the concerns at the Nuremberg Trials was to put the suffering 
person first: he combined Buber‟s idea of a communing relationship with the 
Roman Catholic philosopher Jacques Maritain, person-based philosophy. By 
way of contrast, other medical experts at the Nuremberg, the American 
physiologist Andrew Ivy and neurologist Leo Alexander looked back to 
Hippocrates. We know from the work of Thomas Rütten that Hippocrates 
was an ambivalent basis.
16
 
Ivy‟s “Outline of Principles and Rules of Experimentation on Human 
Subjects”, presented at a meeting at the Pasteur Institute on 1 August 
1946, importantly began with the demand: 
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“I. Consent of the subject is required; i.e. only volunteers should 
be used. 
(a)The volunteers before giving their consent, should be told of the 
hazards, if any.” 
 
Ivy‟s agenda of a set of guiding principles was intended as a modern 
form of Hippocratic Oath, and his public speaking frequently mentioned 
the Oath. At the same time, his outlook was permissive in terms of 
research, even though he recognised ethical limitations. The issues of 
animal and human rights converged. Ivy was at root a mechanistic 
physiologist, relying on animal experiments. Again, there is a contrast to 
Thompson, who advocated that students should learn from their own 
bodies rather than animal experiments.  
The ethos of Ivy‟s viewpoint was geared to the take-off of clinical 
research and trials. Two implications were: 
 
“Voluntary or Informed Consent provided a safeguard within a 
model of science that was reductionist.  
The relationship was contractual between researcher and subject, 
or by extension physician and patient.” 
 
Ivy briefed the legal staff of General Taylor on the ethics of 
experimenting on prisoners. The public should not lose confidence in 
“ethical experimentation.” Ivy‟s route was essentially a bargain struck 
between researcher and subject, and by extension between physician and 
patient. Taking a philosophical view, the corresponding epistemology in 
the analysis of experimentation was empirical and associationist, and 
mechanistic in its presuppositions. The German Medical Observer at the 
Medical Trial, the neurologist, Alexander Mitscherlich reflected on what was 
the human component in doctor-patient relations? Mitscherlich declared that 
it would be a mistake for physicians to distance themselves from the Trial, 
by seeing the accused in terms of an individual lapse of moral standards. In 
fact, every doctor needs to recognise what happens when the individual 
suffering human being becomes an object or a case – “einen Fall”.17 This 
position represented a quite fundamental critique of mechanistic 
reductionism as the epistemological basis of medicine. 
Survivors of experiments were key prosecution witnesses at the 
Nuremberg Medical Trial. They included four of the Ravensbrück “Rabbits” 
(these were 74 Polish women experimental subjects who were originally 
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called “Rabbits” by fellow prisoners and used the name to express defiance, 
solidarity and contempt for their tormentors). As the literary critic George 
Steiner has observed, the Nazis used euphemisms like “disinfection” to 
disguise their murderous conduct. The “Rabbits” used their name as a very 
direct protest against what they considered the injustice of being condemned 
for resistance, but then gratuitously abused for experiments. Another victim 
giving evidence concerning his experiences of malaria experiments and then 
of survival in freezing water experiments at Dachau was a Roman Catholic 
priest, Leo Michalowski, also from Poland.
18
 The Nuremberg prosecutors 
had appealed in the press and on the radio for victims‟ testimony. The 
survivors‟ voice was heard strongly. The resulting evidence brought out 
links to “euthanasia” and genocide. In one dramatic courtroom incident, the 
Roma victim of a Dachau seawater drinking experiment, Karl Hoellenrainer, 
punched the experimenter the Austrian internist, Wilhelm Beiglböck. This 
was an exceptional confrontation in its directness, but is indicative of the 
stress of the courtroom encounter. Those survivors who gave evidence were 
representative not only of the groups experimented on – as sulphonamide 
treatment of wounds, or seawater drinking, but even more broadly of victims 
as a whole.
19
 Their role raises a crucial issue of how many victims there were 
and how widespread the experiments.  
 
“Enlightened Consent” 
 
The neurologist Leo Alexander realised that the legal basis of the 
Medical Trial – the prosecution of war crimes as crimes against humanity - 
was too narrow. He tried to broaden the basis of the trial by applying the 
genocide concept. Alexander argued that the German research represented 
“killing methods for a criminal state”, and as “an aggressive weapon of 
war”.20 As in Ivy‟s draft Code of 31 July 1946, Alexander required consent, 
and voluntary participation of the experimental subject. While Ivy required 
the experiment to be useful, Alexander preferred a more generalised 
                                                     
18
 Harvard Law Library, „Nuremberg Trial Project‟ (Harvard Law School 
Library_<http://nuremberg.law.harvard.edu/php/pflip.php?caseid=HLSL_NMT0
1&docnum=2585&numpages=3&startpage=1&title=Exhibit.&color_setting=C> 
accessed 14 October 2015. 
19
 Weindling, „Victims, Witnesses and the Ethical Legacy of the Nuremberg 
Medical Trial‟ (n  4 ) 74-103.  
20
 Alexander Papers, Durham NC 4/34 Memorandum to Taylor, McHaney and 
Hardy, „The Fundamental Purpose and Meaning of the Experiments in Human 
Beings of which the Accused in Military Tribunal no 1, case no 1) have been 
Indicted: Thanatology as a Scientific Technique of Genocide‟. 
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
 
 
269 
viewpoint, that the experiment should not be unnecessary; both agreed that 
results should be for the good of society. Alexander amplified the concept of 
consent, as based on proven understanding of the exact nature and 
consequences of the experiment. He considered that a doctor or medical 
student was most likely to have the capacity for full understanding. The 
degree of risk was justified by the importance of the experiment, and the 
readiness of the experimenter to risk his own life.
21
  
Alexander as a neurologist had a greater psychological understanding 
than Ivy, when he defined what constituted “enlightened consent”. His 
criteria were “legally valid voluntary consent of the experimental subject” 
requiring:  
 
A. The absence of duress.  
 
B. Sufficient disclosure on the part of the experimenter and 
sufficient understanding of the exact nature and consequences of 
the experiment for which he volunteers, to permit an enlightened 
consent on the part of the experimental subject. The idea of an 
enlightened consent gave the subject greater agency than being 
merely a recipient of passive information.  
 
His outline of principles went on to state: 
 
“2. experiments should be humanitarian with the ultimate aim to 
cure, treat or prevent illness, and not concerned with killing or 
sterilization. 
3. No experiment is permissible when there is the probability that 
death or disabling injury of the experimental subject will occur. 
4. A high degree of skill and care of the experimenting physician 
is required.  
5. The degree of risk taken should never exceed that determined 
by the humanitarian importance of the problem. Ethically 
permissible to perform experiments involving significant risks 
only if not accessible by other means and if he is willing to risk his 
own life. 
6. …the experiment must be such as to yield results for the good 
of society and not be random and unnecessary in nature.” 
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Finally, to protect the research subject, Alexander included special 
provisions to protect mentally ill patients, requiring where possible the 
consent of the patient in addition to the next of kin or guardian. This 
provision was not included in the eventual Code.  
The judges adopted Ivy‟s notion of voluntary consent, which was less 
comprehensive than Alexander‟s enlightened consent. They shifted the focus 
away from the physician to the research subject. What was novel was the 
right to withdraw from the experiment. Ivy had required far less when he 
called for informing the subject of potential hazards. The view that the Code 
“grew out of the Trial itself” omits the formative preliminary period, and the 
crucial inter-Allied discussions.
22
 While the Code was not applied in 
sentencing, the judges followed Ivy in intending that it should prevent future 
abuses.  
Alexander and Ivy cited the Hippocratic notion of the doctor‟s duty of 
care for a patient. Hippocratic ideas were opaque given the problems of 
translation and interpreting the semi-mythical Hippocrates. They became 
subsumed in the political ideology of totalitarianism, in shifting 
responsibility to an abusive state. Medical opposition to interference in the 
doctor-patient relationship meant that – in Ivy‟s words “We must oppose any 
political theory which would regiment the profession under a totalitarian 
authority or insidiously strangle its independence.”23  
Ivy found support in the medical press. An editorial in the British 
Medical Journal diagnosed the problem as political: “the surrender, in fact, 
of the individual conscience to the mass mind of the totalitarian State.”24 
Morris Fishbein, the editor of the Journal of the American Medical 
Association (JAMA) linked the evidence on compulsory sickness insurance 
to the deterioration of the ethics of the German medical profession.
25
 
Physicians turned the abuses of Nazi medicine into a rallying cry against the 
socialisation of medical services. The autonomy of science reflected a 
situation of doctors (notably through the British Medical Association) 
opposing central state planning and the welfare state. The scales of justice 
were heavily tilted by the weight of Cold War requirements for strategically 
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relevant clinical research, and by professional defence of the status of the 
individual practitioner. 
In June 1947 the British Medical Association issued a statement on War 
Crimes and Medicine, diagnosing that the corruption of medicine arose from 
its becoming “an instrument in the hands of the state to be applied in any 
way desired by its rulers.” The view conveniently absolved physicians from 
primary guilt.
26
 The World Medical Association has remained the main 
international body setting international standards on human experimentation: 
it was first at this Association that voluntary and enlightened consent became 
“informed consent”. 
The Nuremberg Code thus arose from the concerns of Allied medical 
war crimes investigators as they encountered the survivors of the human 
experiments and gathered the records of medical atrocities in concentration 
camps and clinics. Thompson took a crucial initiative in convening an 
international committee of forensic pathologists and other medical and legal 
investigators. His International Scientific Commission offered an alternative 
tribunal to a public trial - that of expert evaluation conducted in closed 
session. The debates on research provided the initial stimulus for the 
formulation of a code of experimental ethics. The judges reverted to Ivy‟s 
notion of “voluntary consent”, while they recognised the autonomy rights of 
the experimental subject in having the freedom to leave the experiment at 
any time.  
The judicial promulgation of the guidelines left the status of these 
guidelines unresolved. Although promulgated to a military tribunal, the 
proceedings were conducted under a glare of publicity with press, and 
medical, legal and governmental observers. It meant that the guidelines 
were effectively published. Subsequent accounts of the Trial, the US 
abbreviated edition and the digest by the medical observer Alexander 
Mitscherlich, included these.  
Ivy warned how the evils of bureaucratised and unethical Nazi science 
could recur. The lesson Ivy drew from Nuremberg was that it was 
necessary to sustain clinical freedom for the medical researcher. The 
cancer drug Krebiozen offered the hope for a non-toxic therapy. 
Unfortunately, the drug was bogus, and Ivy was discredited.  
Ivy has been further discredited in that historian Jon Hearkness argues 
that Ivy committed perjury at Nuremberg. In contrast to the UK, 
experiments on prisoners were established practice in US penitentiaries. 
Ivy maintained that Statesville, Illinois penitentiary experiments had the 
approval of an ethical committee. Although this committee had been 
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appointed, it had not met, a mitigating factor is that Ivy did correspond 
with committee members on an individual basis. One might also see Ivy 
as taking in effect “Chairman‟s Action”. So while technically giving a 
misleading impression regarding the Committee, there were some 
exonerating circumstances.
27
 Ivy has also been – unfairly – lambasted as 
incompetent in his evidence at Nuremberg. While infectious diseases were 
not a special area of his expertise, Ivy did well regarding digestive 
physiology regarding the seawater drinking experiments. He had 
conducted a self-experiment, and was tolerant when research subjects 
absconded. He astutely noticed that the accused medical researcher 
Beiglböck altered evidence in his prison cell. Ivy is a tragic figure, and 
although not beyond criticism does merit a degree of rehabilitation, as not 
unethical in his experiments, and as essentially well motivated. 
Ivy‟s engagement with Krebiozen shows something more positive 
than just scientific naivety: as motivated by support for a non-toxic cancer 
cure. So while he allowed scientific standards to lapse, the motive was 
patient welfare. Here we see a common pattern with medical scientists 
involved at Nuremberg. Alexander moved from neurology to psychiatry, 
more concerned with care for the whole person. Thompson similarly 
moved from neuro-physiology to education (initiating the Unesco 
programme for Germany), and then also to psychiatry. For, the contact 
with victims remained a determining experience. Those driving forward 
the ethical agenda cared for victims. Alexander supported the efforts to 
look after the Polish “Rabbits” indicate this, with the efforts of others in 
the USA to organise care and therapy. 
 
LEGACIES 
 
The victims‟ perspective opens the way to more fully historicised 
concepts and procedures in the understanding of the patient both 
historically and in modern clinical contexts. Informed Consent as the 
cardinal principle of physician-patient relations is a very recent 
innovation, and linked to the “birth of bioethics” since the early 1970s 
when dedicated institutes – the Kennedy Institute and Hastings Centers - 
were founded in the United States.
28
 Bioethics chimed with more critical 
and sceptical views of science as part of the counter-culture of protest 
since the 1960s. 
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Bioethicists – as an emerging lay professional group - wanted a code 
as part of a sense of the need to regulate innovations. A code also served 
to legitimate bioethicists‟ nascent endeavours. Thus the Nuremberg 
principles became referred to as the “Nuremberg Code” during the early 
1960s. Many of the Nuremberg Trials dealt with aspects of unethical 
medical research. In formulating a set of principles, the American judges 
had two aims: first to make clear the principles supporting their judgment. 
Second, - at the prompting of Ivy who was expert witness to the court – to 
issue a series of guidelines that might prevent such abuses occurring in the 
future. Ivy had two objectives: first, that there should not be a massive 
public surge of outrage against all clinical research. In this sense the 
judicial principles that he recommended were permissive – it was the lay 
judges who empowered the research subject by inserting that the subject 
could terminate the experiment at any time. Second, that public opposition 
to vivisection should be defeated by showing that human research was by 
far the greater cruelty.  
There is a thin thread of evidence linking the Helsinki Declaration of 
1964 to what has been called – retrospectively the Nuremberg Code, the 
judicial pronouncement of 19 August 1947. On the other, and here 
philosophical commentaries are enlightening – consent goes back to the 
contract tradition in philosophy. This has echoes of commercial contracts, 
as well as of the regulation of political power between subject and ruler.
29
 
To their credit, the first major collection on the Nuremberg Code was 
edited by the Boston University bioethicists George Annas and Michael 
Grodin in 1992. 
Despite their important efforts, the history of informed consent 
remains problematic as de-historicised and restricted to a series of legal 
verdicts. It involves less the democratising of clinical knowledge but the 
notion of being informed. Here the subject takes a passive role, with the 
expert being actively in authority, as instructing about risks etc. The term 
“Nuremberg Code” is retrospective construct: it appears to have first been 
used from 1963.  
On the one side, the American bioethicist, Jay Katz argued that 
although the Nuremberg Code was an important symbolic statement, it 
had no major role, as case law was decisive.
30
 His view contrasts to that of 
Annas and Grodin that “all contemporary debate on human 
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experimentation is grounded in Nuremberg”. They commend – rightly in 
my view – the remarkable “focus on universal ethical codes in the context 
of a trial.” But their view is ironically as fixated on courtroom procedure 
as Katz. The Harvard anaesthetist Henry Beecher, a noted critical voice 
against unbridled experimentalism, in 1966 cautioned against excessive 
experimentation, and characterised the Nuremberg code as “legalistic”, 
whereas Helsinki more wholly ethical in spirit.
31
 American bioethicists 
have been content to work through a legal framework, and since 1973 
references have been made to Nazi doctors in US court rulings.
32
  
The legacies have conventionally been considered at a medical level – 
at that of the World Medical Association, and the transition to the 
Helsinki Declaration‟s principles on human experimentation. What this 
shows is that the judicial principles were ignored, then the effort was 
made to introduce a Hippocratic style “Code of Geneva”, and finally 
informed consent came to operate. While both paths are significant, it 
seems to me that two elements are missing: the commemoration, and care 
of victims of the experiments.  
The twenty children were commemorated anonymously, not least on a 
memorial plaque dating from 1967. The journalist Günther Schwarberg 
first found photographs in 1977, and a list of names in 1978. (Two were 
incorrect; one identified by the mother in 1982, and another by his sister 
in 2015). It meant that relatives could be finally informed as to their 
children‟s fate. A memorial dates from 1980, and rose garden from 1982. 
In 1994 two Dutch victims were commemorated by a memorial stone in 
Eindhoven. This commemorates the children by name. In 1995 on the 50
th
 
anniversary streets were named in the Hamburg district of Burgwedel 
after the children.
33
  
In 1985 the radical historian Götz Aly called for the destruction of 
body parts from anatomical collections. Until this time, institutions felt 
aggrieved when accusations were levelled against them, and Aly was 
primarily concerned to show the networks of perpetrators. The 
distinguished biochemist Otto Butenandt declared this an insult to the 
dignity of the Max Planck Society, the prestigious research organisation 
directed by him. Then things suddenly changed in 1989. This culminated 
in a conference of German university ministers and rectors in 1989. In 
December 1990 histological specimens and brains of 33 children and 
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youths killed in 1940 at Brandenburg-Görden and held by the Max Planck 
Institute for Brain Research in Frankfurt were buried. But representatives 
of German academic institutions were present, rather than relatives or 
other Nazi victims.
34
 Removal of body parts was done rapidly in the 
Federal Republic from 1989, virtually as (to use a National Socialist 
phrase) a Nacht und Nebel (“Night and Fog”) Action in that the 
“contaminating” specimens disappeared without documentation. The idea 
was not to document and to establish provenance. There is consequently 
no listing of institutes which held body parts deriving from Nazi 
persecution and genocide. In Austria, the process took longer but has been 
more thoughtful, as individual urns at the Zentralfriedhof Vienna received 
the parts of victims in 2002.  
Memorials for victims of research atrocities are few, and only 
exceptionally commemorate victims with the dignity of their full name. 
The Strasbourg gravestone for the victims of the Jewish anatomical 
collection is stark and dignified, yet necessarily anonymous. The identities 
of the victims are now known, and we can understand how Auschwitz was 
a selection centre for victims across Europe. The most personally and 
engaged is for the twenty children selected in Auschwitz, experimented on 
with a tuberculosis preparation at Neuengamme concentration camp, and 
brutally killed in the cellar at Bullenhusen Damm on 20 April 1945. Here 
the lives of the children have been reconstructed with a caring dignity. In 
Heidelberg, Carl Schneider‟s victims are commemorated, but the 
memorial depersonalises. Known victims have been de-identified.
35
 
History offers an important form of public accountability for medical 
malpractice. The historian can assess whether practitioners and 
researchers have shown due care for persons in their care. Unless one 
names, we cannot identify, understand the extent of the atrocity and the 
suffering. For without a name, we cannot understand the networks of 
institutions, how a person was transferred from camp to camp, and clinic 
to clinic. 
There has been a lack of compensation for victims. The UN Human 
Rights Division passed on 4 July 1950 a resolution on the plight of 
victims of the so-called scientific experiments. The Federal German 
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Ministry of Finance turned down numerous applications from the mid-
1950s onwards. Under regulations of 1953 and 1956 the Bonn 
government denied compensation on the grounds that the experiments 
were not harmful, or that the victim was not in need. At first sterilisation 
victims and all former Resistance combatants were automatically 
excluded, but then given the lowest rate of compensation. While 87 
sterilisation victims received 2000 DM, only one had received 
compensation for sulphonamide experiments, albeit at a far higher rate. 
The German governmental position was regarded with contempt both by 
survivors‟ representative bodies, and psychotherapists, sympathetic to 
what was becoming recognised as “survivors‟ trauma”. There was hardly 
any effort to cover the full costs of care, and to provide medical assistance 
for victims. The demands of sterilisation victims for operative reversal of 
sterilisation were ignored. Sickness insurance funds have never responded 
to the need to redress medical injuries. Most attention was given to the 
maimed and injured “Rabbits” of Ravensbrück, but generally the situation 
has been and remains one of neglect and marginalisation. The final 
chapter in the history of compensation is that of the injuries falling into 
the category of “sonstige Personenschäden” attached as subsidiary to the 
forced labour compensation. Here, the single lump sum compensation has 
been often retraumatising and perceived as a further injury. This view was 
vividly stated by the sterilisation survivor, Simon Rozenkier to the New 
York Times in 2003.
36
  
By the early 1960s the Federal German government wished to declare 
the post-war era over, and terminate compensation procedures, which still 
did not adequately recognised medical crimes.
37
 Doctors who were former 
Nazis adjudicated on compensation applications. Their diagnostic 
categories were relics of the Nazi era.
38
 Psychiatrists pointed out that by 
labelling a claimant as a hereditary schizophrenic, the Germans were 
denying responsibility for the traumatic after effects of the experiments. 
At this point John Thompson teamed up with the New York psychiatrists 
Martin Wangh, Kurt Eissler and William Niederland, who had pioneered 
analysis of “survivors‟ syndrome”, to organise the Provisional Committee 
for Victims of Human Disasters in 1964. The Committee protested to the 
German Chancellor Erhard that 43% of compensation claims were 
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rejected by the Federal German government, which disregarded clear 
evidence of damage to health because of “outmoded” medical 
knowledge.
39
 Their studies acted as symbolic bridge between first hand 
observers of the atrocities and concerned social scientists and historians. 
In September 1964 Jay Katz asked Taylor about preparatory drafts of the 
Final Code.
40
 The Committee invited the Yale psychologist, Robert Lifton 
to address the meeting on psychological effects on the Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki victims – indicating a wish to critically engage with the 
psychology of the victor.
41
 Lifton contacted Leo Alexander, McHaney and 
Telford Taylor, as his interest was aroused by the problem of the Nazi 
medical psychology.
42
 The meeting rekindled recognition for the victims 
of human experiments, and marked an entry point of historians and 
bioethicists into the field. The Nuremberg Code at last began to achieve 
legal recognition, although this has been a lamentably slow process.  
We are left with an irony. Data protection laws and ethics are meant to 
protect victims. The effect is to protect perpetrators, by concealing the 
places where a particular victim was selected. On balance, data protection 
laws protect the perpetrators, and the legal, administrative and financial 
agencies supporting research. Despite Germany‟s efforts in Holocaust 
recognition, commemoration and memorials are few for victims of 
medical atrocities. The medical victims can be seen as marginalised, 
misunderstood, and essentially forgotten – indeed, never recognised in 
any meaningful way. There is no death book giving the names for all 
victims of the “euthanasia” killings. While a number of institutions have 
memorials for victims of “euthanasia” at respective institutions, but full 
names are never given in the Federal Republic (in contrast to Austria). At 
most, as at the Heidelberg Psychiatric clinic, the first name and initial is 
given. Public prosecutions could allow names to be cited. Here, we may 
cite the history of the adolescent, Ernst Lossa, who was a medically 
murdered victim at Kaufbeuren, as an exception.
43
  
Informed consent has become a sacrosanct principle of bioethics. 
Consent forms have become part of routine clinical procedure in the UK. 
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One point of concern is that informing requires expertise and specialist 
knowledge. How to inform meaningfully is intrinsically problematic. The 
risk is that the information will be so technical and expert that the subject 
ultimately relies on trust which is however not part of the system.  
The irony of the current situation is that an ethic nominally to protect 
the person has the effect of depersonalising and limiting the ethical 
obligation of physician to patient in terms of a formulaic contract. We find 
a situation of anonymisation and depersonalisation reflected in our limited 
understanding too of Nazi medical atrocities limited to perpetrators, and 
disinterested in victims and their life histories. In the Federal German 
Republic, there has been a situation of nominal and inadequate 
compensation. Every conceivable barrier has been placed to block 
understanding of victims of medical atrocities. The system generally is 
one of screening out the identity of the individual person. The anonymised 
blacked out or partially suppressed names are synonymous with a society 
uncomfortable with the legacy of a traumatic past. The strict 
confidentiality required serves to protect institutions and bureaucrats from 
scrutiny. The question remains, whether the mission to legitimate clinical 
research rendered the Code too permissive in what it condoned, and too 
weak in its laying down of safeguards for the patient? 
 
